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Abstract 
The optimism bias is the tendency to judge one’s own risk as 
less than the risk of others. In the present study we found that 
also finance professionals (N = 60) displayed an optimism 
bias when forecasting the return of an investment made by 
themselves or by a colleague of the same expertise. Using a 
multidimensional approach to the assessment of risk 
perception, we found that participants’ forecasts were biased 
not because they judged negative consequences as less likely 
for themselves, but because they were overconfident in their 
ability to avoid and control them. 
Keywords: Optimism bias; unrealistic comparative 
optimism; financial risk; investment risk; perceived control; 
illusion of control. 
Introduction 
Finance professionals deal every day with uncertainty and 
the danger of losing money, putting a lot of effort into 
minimizing adverse outcomes. In other words, their job 
consists in willingly taking risks and trying to manage them. 
While the danger of losing money is real, there is no such 
thing as a “real” or “objective” risk. Indeed, risk is a 
psychological construct, which refers to how people 
understand and cope with dangers and uncertainties of life 
(Sjöberg, Moen, & Rundmo, 2004; Slovic, 1999). An 
extensive body of research has focused on risk perception, 
which is the subjective assessment of the probability as well 
as the consequences and characteristics of a negative 
outcome. (Sjöberg et al., 2004). As Zweig wrote about 
financial risk, “If you want to know what risk really is, go to 
the nearest bathroom and step up to the mirror. That’s risk, 
gazing back at you from the glass” (Graham & Zweig, 2006, 
p. 528). 
One of the most robust findings in risk perception 
literature is that people make quite different judgments of 
personal and general risk, with personal risk being usually 
lower than general risk (for a review, see Armor & Taylor, 
2002). For example, people believe that negative events 
such as having a heart attack, divorcing a few years after 
marriage or getting fired from a job are less likely to happen 
to them than to the average person (Weinstein, 1980). This 
sense of subjective immunity has been called optimism bias
or unrealistic comparative optimism (Shepperd, Klein, 
Waters, & Weinstein, 2013), since the commonly shared 
perception of being less as risk as the average peer is not 
only optimistic but also unrealistic. 
There is evidence that optimism plays a role also in the 
perception of financial risks. Optimism, as a dispositional 
trait, has been linked to individual economic decision-
making: Moderate optimists display reasonable financial 
behavior, whereas extreme optimists display financial habits 
and behavior that are generally not considered prudent (Puri 
& Robinson, 2007). Moreover, analysts have been shown to 
be systematically overoptimistic in their forecasts about the 
earnings potential of firms at the time of their initial public 
offerings, and this optimism increases as the length of the 
forecast period increases (McNichols & O’Brien, 1997; 
Rajan & Servaes, 1997). To the best of our knowledge, 
however, the presence of the optimism bias/unrealistic 
comparative optimism in financial risk (i.e., judging 
personal risk of losing money as lower than other investors’ 
risk) has never been subject of empirical testing. 
The main aim of this study is to investigate whether the 
optimism bias can be observed also in experts in the field of 
financial risk. Second, the study aims to identify the sources 
that give rise to this bias, through the adoption of a 
multidimensional approach to the assessment of risk 
perception, based on the psychometric paradigm of risk 




A total of 60 finance experts (43 men, 17 women; mean 
age=38.25 years, SD=9.33; mean expertise=12.95 years, 
SD=10.02), working as brokers, financial consultants, 
financial analysts, and bankers, were contacted at their 
workplace. All experts agreed to participate in the study on 
a voluntary basis. 
Materials 
Experts were presented with a scenario reporting the 
current financial situation of a company (NewCo), which is 
about to issue an IPO (Initial Public Offering). The scenario 
included a detailed explanation of the company’s 
background, products, and business strategy. Experts were 
randomly assigned to the self or peer condition, in a 
between participants design. 
Experts were asked first to forecast the return after two 
years (positive vs. negative) of a € 5.000 investment in the 
new issued NewCo shares made by themselves (in the self 
condition) or by a colleague of the same age, sex and 
expertise (in the peer condition). Then, they were asked to 
judge the investment risk for themselves (in the self 
condition) or for their colleague (in the peer condition), by 
responding to a risk perception questionnaire based on the 
psychometric paradigm. Using a 5-point scale, experts had 
to rate the following six dimensions of financial risk: 
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1. Knowledge of risk; 
2. Probability of a negative return; 
3. Possibility to avoid a negative return; 
4. Fear of a negative return; 
5. Magnitude of potential losses; 
6. Possibility to control potential losses. 
Finally, experts compiled an attitude to economic risk 
scale (Sjöberg & Engelberg, 2009), a 22-item measure of 
individual differences in risk attitude about economic 
decision-making (in the present study, Cronbach’s  = 
0.76). 
Results 
Experts’ forecasts were significantly more optimistic in 
the self condition than in the peer condition (expected 
positive return: 83.30% vs. 63.30%, ²(1,60) = 3.07, p < 0.05 
one-sided). 
Experts’ ratings of financial risk dimensions are reported 
in Table 1. Statistical analyses revealed that experts judged 
themselves (self condition) as more capable to avoid a 
negative return (t = 2.04, df = 58, p < 0.05, d = 0.52) and 
control potential losses (t = 2.56, df = 58, p < .05, d = 0.66) 
than their colleague of the same expertise (peer condition). 
When a subsequent one way independent analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) was conducted separately on avoidance 
and control, no significant effects of experts’ gender, age 
and economic risk attitude as covariates were found (all ps > 
0.21). 
Table 1: Mean ratings of financial risk dimensions 
(standard deviations in parenthesis). 
Logistic regression with backward stepwise selection was 
conducted to assess whether risk dimensions significantly 
predicted experts’ forecasts. The only significant predictor 
turned out to be the control dimension, indicating that the 
odds of expecting a positive return are increasingly greater 
as perceived control increases (B = 0.57, Wald = 4.17, df = 
1, p < 0.05). 
Discussion 
Finance professionals displayed an optimism bias in their 
own expertise field: They were 20% more likely to forecast 
future return of a risky investment as positive when it was 
made by themselves, than when the same investment was 
made by a colleague of the same age, sex, and expertise. 
What are the reasons of this difference? The analysis of risk 
perception can help explain this unrealistic comparative 
optimism. Indeed, experts were found to be more confident 
in their own ability to avoid a negative return and to control 
potential losses, than in their colleagues’ one. Other 
dimensions of financial risk perception did not differ 
between self-perception and peer-perception, and no effects 
of gender, age, and attitude to financial risk-taking were 
found. Thus, it seems that experts’ forecasts were biased not 
because they judged negative consequences as less likely for 
themselves (the “it won’t happen to me” attitude; 
Caponecchia, 2010), but because they thought to be capable 
to avoid and control them (“if it happens, it won’t hurt me”). 
However, since the negative consequences of an economic 
investment such as buying shares of an IPO are hardly 
controllable by the investor, experts’ overconfidence can be 
seen as the consequence of the illusion of control, a bias 
consisting in the belief of being more in control than is 
possible (e.g., when people view the chances of winning the 
lottery as higher if they choose the number themselves; 
Langer, 1975). 
The results of the present study are consistent with 
previous research suggesting a positive relationship between 
controllability and the optimism bias, such that events 
perceived to have a high degree of controllability result in 
high levels of optimism bias (Klein & Larsen, 2002; Harris, 
1996; Weinstein, 1980). Specifically, our results support the 
idea that perceived controllability of a risky behavior, rather 
than actual controllability, is a sufficient condition for the 
optimism bias to arise. 
This tendency to perceive oneself less at risk as the others 
represents a challenge for financial risk communication: 
How to effectively communicate probability and magnitude 
of potential future losses, when everybody overstates its 
ability to ride out of negative consequences? We advocate 
Benjamin Graham’s suggestion to enterprising investors, 
that “operations for profit should be based not on optimism 
but on arithmetic” (Graham & Zweig, 2006, p. 523). 
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